On the Path Toward Precision: Responding to the Need for Clear Statutes in the Criminal Law by Tharney, Executive Director, Laura C. et al.














II.COMMISSION	PROJECTS	RESPONDING	 TO	 THE	NEED	 FOR	CLARITY	 IN	 THE	
CRIMINAL	LAW ................................................................................................ 332 
A.  Mens Rea for Disorderly Persons Offenses.............................. 332 
B.  “Tumultuous” in the Disorderly Persons Context ................. 336 
C.  Harassment in the Criminal Law ................................................. 339 
D.  Aggravated Assault by Means of Bodily Fluids ...................... 344 




A statute may be unclear in a number of different ways:  it may be 
vague, it may be anachronistic, it may be inconsistent, to name just a few.  
Statutes inform individuals of their rights and responsibilities.  
Clarity of language is crucial to the transmission of this information.  
Nowhere is this more significant than in criminal statutes.  In Grayned	v.	
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City	of	Rockford,1 the United States Supreme Court said that “[v]ague 
laws offend several important values.”2   
The Court explained that because it assumed that “man is free to 
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct” it is essential that “laws 
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”3  “Vague laws 
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.”4   
The Grayned	Court further noted that to prevent “arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement . . . laws must provide explicit standards for 
those who apply them.  A vague law impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad	
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application.”5   
The New Jersey Supreme Court cited the Grayned case in support 
of the doctrine that penal statutes must be strictly construed.6  That 
doctrine “has at its heart the requirement of due process.  No one shall 
be punished for a crime unless both that crime and its punishment are 
clearly set forth in positive laws.”7  Further, penal statutes  “must be 
sufficiently definite so that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited.”8  
In addition to the failure to provide adequate guidance for ordinary 
citizens, unclear laws also cause interpretive difficulties for the courts 
bound to apply them.  The decisions in those challenging cases are one 
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1Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
2Id. at 108. 
	 3	 Id. 
	 4	 Id. 
	 5	 Id.at 108-09. 
 6 State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 17 (1987). 
	 7	 Id.	at 17-18 (quoting In re Suspension of DeMarco,	83 N.J. 25, 36 (1980)).  
	 8	 Id. at 18 (citing Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983)). 
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source of projects for the New Jersey Law Revision Commission (“the 
Commission”).   
The Commission is charged, by statute, with the responsibility for 
conducting a continuous review of the general and permanent statutes 
of the State, and the judicial decisions construing those statutes, to 
discover defects and anachronisms.9  In addition, the statute calls for the 
Commission to prepare and submit to the Legislature bills that are 
designed to remedy the defects, reconcile conflicting provisions of the 
law, clarify confusing language, and excise redundancies.10  The statute 
also directs the Commission to maintain the statutes in a revised, 
consolidated, and simplified form.11  
In January of 2020, at the end of the second year of New Jersey’s 
2018 Legislative session, the New Jersey Legislature passed, and the 
Governor signed into law, L.2019, c.474, which changes the law 
pertaining to sexual assault.12  A2767 and S2924, the bills giving rise to 
the statutory modifications, were based on a Report issued by the 
Commission in 2014.13  That Report recommended changes to the 
statute concerning sexual assault to better reflect the modern reality of 
New Jersey ’s sexual offense prosecutions, making the statutory text 
consistent with the decisions of New Jersey’s courts, and with the 
instructions delivered to jurors during criminal proceedings.14  
The changes to the law removed the outdated “physical force” 
requirement from the crime of sexual assault, and incorporated 
language used by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State	in	the	Interest	
of	M.T.S.,15 and in State	v.	Triestman.16  In those cases, the court held that 
the element of physical force is satisfied when the defendant engages in 
any act of sexual penetration without the affirmative and freely-given 
permission of the victim to the specific act of penetration.17  New Jersey 
 
 9 See, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:12A-8 (2020). 
	 10	 Id. 
	 11	 Id. 
 12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (2020). New Jersey State Legislature, 2018-2019 Session, 
A.B. 2767/S.B. 2924, Senate Law and Public Safety Committee Statement with 
Committee Amendments; 
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/A3000/2767_S2.PDF (last visited March 24, 
2021). 
	 13	 Id. 
 14 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Relating to Title 2C – Sexual Offenses (Dec. 
8, 2014), https://www.njlrc.org/projects/2020/2/5/title-2c-sexual-
offenses?rq=title%202c%20-%20sexual%20 (last visited Mar. 21, 2021) [hereinafter 
NJLRC, Dec. 2014 Final Report]. 
 15 State in the Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 424-25 (1992). 
 16 State v. Triestman, 416 N.J. Super. 195, 210 (App. Div. 2010). 
 17 NJLRC, Dec. 2014 Final Report, supra	note 14.  
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jurors are likewise instructed that physical force is an act of sexual 
penetration that occurs without a victim’s freely and affirmatively given 
permission.18 
In addition, the law now incorporates the standard set forth in 
State	 v.	Olivio,19 and included in the current jury instructions, that a 
person shall be considered to have a mental disease or defect if they are 
incapable of understanding or exercising the right to refuse to engage in 
sexual conduct.20 
The law was also updated to make it gender neutral, make it 
consistent with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
phrase  “on another” in State	 v.	 Rangel,21 and to add the crime of 
carjacking as an aggravating offense for sexual assault in response to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s refusal to deem it so without a specific 
statutory basis in State	v.	Drury.22   
That Report is just one example of the Commission’s work in the 
criminal law area.  The five additional projects discussed in this Article 
provide a brief look at New Jersey’s criminal law, and the Commission’s 




A. MENS REA FOR DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES 
In New Jersey, when a statute does not prescribe a culpable mental 
state for the commission of an offense, the mens rea of “knowingly” shall 
be applied.23  The authority to incorporate this mental state is found in 
New Jersey ’s Code of Criminal Justice (“CCJ”), specifically, N.J.S. 2C:2-2, 
commonly referred to as the “gap filler” statute.24  The Commission’s 
examination of the CCJ confirmed that numerous disorderly persons 
offenses do not set forth a requisite mental state, requiring courts to 
gap-fill this essential element.25  
 
	 18	 Id. 
 19 State v. Olivio, 123 N.J. 550 (1991). 
	 20	 Id. 
 21 State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500 (2013). 
	 22	 Id.; State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197 (2007). 
 23 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Relating to Mens Rea for Disorderly Persons 
Offenses (Dec. 20, 2018), www.njlrc.org (last visited March 19, 2021) [hereinafter 
NJLRC Dec. 2018 Final Report].  
	 24	 Id. 
	 25	 Id. 
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In December of 2018, after a review of all the disorderly persons 
offenses enumerated within the CCJ, the Commission released a Final 
Report recommending inclusion of the appropriate mental element 
where applicable.26  The Final Report clarified that where a statute does 
not prescribe a culpable mental state for the commission of a specified 
disorderly persons offense, pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:2-2 a mens rea of 
“knowingly” shall be applied.27  Thus, courts would not have to fill in the 
required mental element for disorderly persons offenses lacking explicit 
statutory wording, as the Appellate Division did in State	v.	Bessey,28 the 
case that gave rise to this project.  
In Bessey, the Appellate Division examined N.J.S. 2C:33-7, which 
codifies the disorderly persons offense of obstructing highways and 
other public passages.29  The plaintiff, an animal rights advocate, was 
distributing leaflets outside an arena in Trenton that was hosting a 
circus performance.30  When the plaintiff stepped into a crosswalk to 
distribute a pamphlet to a motorist, a police officer admonished her for 
what he considered dangerous conduct.31  The plaintiff then crossed the 
street, moving to an area with heavy pedestrian and vehicular traffic, 
and started distributing the literature there.32  The same police officer 
concluded that her activities were contributing to, and possibly 
worsening, traffic congestion on that side, and instructed her to move 
away from the crosswalk and the sidewalk area between the 
crosswalks.33  After a verbal exchange between the two, plaintiff was 
arrested and subsequently convicted for violating N.J.S. 2C:33-7b(1).34  
New Jersey ’s statute regarding the obstruction of highways and 
other public passages provides, in relevant part: 
 
a. A person, who having no legal privilege to do so, purposely 
or recklessly obstructs any highway or other public passage 
whether alone or with others, commits a petty disorderly 
persons offense . . .  
 
 26 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Minutes	of	NJLRC	Meeting, Dec. 20, 2018, www.njlrc.org 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2021). 
 27 NJLRC Dec. 2018 Final Report, supra note 23.  
 28 State v. Bessey, 2014 WL 9928205 (App. Div. 2015). 
	 29	 Id.	at *1. 
	 30	 Id.  
	 31	 Id. at *3. 
	 32	 Id. at *4. 
	 33	 Id. at *5. 
	 34	 Bessey, 2014 WL 9928205 at *5. 
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b. A person in a gathering commits a petty disorderly persons 
offense if he refuses to obey a reasonable official request or 
order to move:  
(1) To prevent obstruction of a highway or other public 
passage; or  
(2) To maintain public safety by dispersing those 
gathered in dangerous proximity to a fire or other hazard 
. . ..35 
 
Affirming the trial court ’s ruling, the Appellate Division focused on 
the intent required for the offense of  “obstruct[ing] highways and other 
public passages” since the statute is silent in this regard.36  The court 
explained that despite both parties’ argument that “knowingly” is the 
correct mens rea, their reliance on the gap filler of N.J.S. 2C:2-2c(3) was 
misplaced, as that provision applies only to a crime, and the case at bar 
involved a petty disorderly persons offense.37  The court noted that the 
terms  “offense” and “crime” are used distinctly in N.J.S. 2C:2-2c(3), 
indicating that different levels of culpability should be considered based 
on the nature of the charge.38 
After considering the definition of “refuses” in both its plain and 
legal uses, the court concluded that the term “refuses to obey a 
reasonable official request or order to move” means an individual who 
willfully and knowingly defies a reasonable command from a law 
enforcement officer which, in this case, was to prevent obstruction of a 
highway or other public passage.39  While the court’s interpretation did 
comport with the default standard contained in N.J.S. 2C:2-2c(3), it was 
careful to explain that the default only applies to crimes, and cannot be 
read into disorderly persons offenses.40 
The Commission’s research in this area was intended to clarify the 
statute, to avoid the additional legal analysis required of a court in the 
absence of a statutory mens rea.  The Commission also recognized that 
establishing an explicit mens rea could prevent potential 
overcriminalization.  The problem of overcriminalization, the overuse 
or misuse of criminal law, has been recognized across the spectrum of 
political and philosophical beliefs.41  Overcriminalization may occur 
 
 35 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-7 (2020). 
	 36	 Bessey, 2014 WL 9928205 at *6. 
	 37	 Id.	at *7. 
	 38	 Id. 
	 39	 Id. at *8. 
	 40	 Id. at *7. 
	 41	 See, e.g., THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A Judicial Cure for the Disease of 
Overcriminalization, https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/judicial-cure-the-
THARNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2021  7:11 PM 
2021]	 ON	THE	PATH	TOWARDS	PRECISION 335 
through “(1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines 
that overextend culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority; 
(5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or 
pretextual enforcement of petty violations.”42  One way to address 
aspects of this problem is to identify criminal laws that lack a mens rea 
requirement.43 
While overcriminalization is caused in part by the proliferation of 
criminal laws enacted by legislatures, courts also play a role when they 
choose to construe ambiguous criminal statutes broadly.44  As noted by 
the United States Supreme Court, to punish an individual based on acts 
alone, without a culpable mental state, is “inconsistent with our 
philosophy of criminal law.”45  An explicit mens rea requirement is 
therefore  “an essential safeguard against unjust convictions and 
disproportionate punishment.”46 
The Commission’s proposed modification to N.J.S. 2C:2-2(c)(3) is 
consistent with the language of the court’s opinion in Bessey, and it 
recommends that any reference to a crime should instead refer to an 
offense.47  Absent a clear legislative intent to impose strict liability, any 
statutory definition of an offense shall be construed based on the 
culpability defined in N.J.S. 2C:2-2(b)(2).48  The proposed modifications 
were sent to stakeholders and no objection was received to the 
proposed statutory changes.49 
This project, and others like it, reflects the Commission’s 
dedication to improving the form and function of the criminal laws in 
the state. 
 
disease-overcriminalization (last visited March 19, 2021).  See	also SALON, America’s 
Over-criminalization Epidemic: How the Prosecution of Atlanta Teachers Exposes a 
Broken System, 
https://www.salon.com/2015/04/16/americas_over_criminalization_epidemic_how_t
he_prosecution_of_atlanta_teachers_exposes_a_broken_system/ (last visited March 19, 
2021). 
 42 Erik Luna, The	Overcriminalization	Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005). 
 43 Marc A. Levin, At	 the	State	Level,	So‐Called	Crimes	Are	Here,	There,	Everywhere, 
CRIM. JUST., Spring 2013, at 4. 
 44 Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming	Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
537, 568 (2012). 
 45 Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
 46 Smith, supra	note 44, at 569. 
 47 NJLRC Dec. 2018 Final Report, supra	note 23. 
 48 The proposed statutory language is as follows: *** A statute defining a crime an 
offense, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability plainly 
appears, should be construed as defining a crime an offense with the culpability defined 
in paragraph b.(2) of this section.  This provision applies to offenses crimes defined both 
within and outside of this code and to offenses within this code. 
 49 NJLRC Dec. 2018 Final Report, supra	note 23.  
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B. “TUMULTUOUS” IN THE DISORDERLY PERSONS CONTEXT 
Though the term “tumultuous” is antiquated, it has been employed 
in New Jersey’s CCJ without a definition to describe the conduct of a 
disorderly person.50  In September of 2018, the Commission considered 
the question of what constitutes “tumultuous” behavior pursuant to 
New Jersey ’s Disorderly Conduct statute, N.J.S. 2C:33-2.51  The absence 
of a statutory definition, and the significance of the penalties an 
individual may face because of  “tumultuous” behavior in public, 
necessitated an examination of this statute.52  
The Commission released a Final Report proposing several 
statutory modifications in December 2019.53  The Commission’s Report 
recommends the removal of vague and undefined terms such as 
“annoyance” and “tumultuous”; inserts a prohibition on  “excessive 
noise”; eliminates the unconstitutional “offensive language” subsection; 
and adds a definition for the term “public” to bring clarity to the 
statute.54 
The court’s decision in State	v.	Finnemen,55 in which the Appellate 
Division considered the definition of the words “tumultuous” and 
“public” in New Jersey ’s Disorderly Conduct statute, N.J.S. 2C:33-2(b), 
drew the Commission’s attention to this area of the law.56  
In that case, after being asked to leave a local drug store, the 
defendant yelled obscenities and made obscene gestures toward the 
store employees.57  A police officer observed the defendant’s behavior 
and characterized it as “irate and angr[y].”58  The defendant then 
entered a nail salon and continued to “yell and cause a scene.”59  The 
defendant was apprehended and convicted of disorderly conduct and 
resisting arrest by both the municipal court and then by the Law 
 
 50 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-2 (West 2020).  
	 51	 See Memorandum from Wendy Llewellyn, former Legislative Law Clerk on 
Meaning of “Tumultuous” and “Public” – N.J.S. 2C:33-2 to the New Jersey Law Revision 
Commission (Sept. 10, 2018) (on file with the Commission). 
	 52	 See N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, ‘Definition	of	Tumultuous’, Minutes	of	NJLRC	Meeting, 
Sept. 20, 2018, Newark, N.J., www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2021). 
 53 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Regarding the Terms “Public” and 
“Tumultuous” as Used in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice – N.J.S. 2C:33-2 et seq. 
(Dec. 19, 2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/596f60f4eb 
bd1a322db09e45/ t/5e14ade0 690a736404884e5c/1 578413537950/tumul 
tFR121919.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2021) [hereinafter NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report].  
	 54	 Id. 
 55 State v. Finnemen, 2017 WL 4448541 (App. Div. Oct. 6, 2017). 
	 56	 Id.; NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53. 
	 57	 Finnemen, 2017 WL 4448541 at *1. 
	 58	 Id. at *2. 
	 59	 Id. at *1-2. 
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Division judge in a trial de novo.60  On appeal, the defendant contended 
that, among other issues, his behavior did not rise to the level of 
“tumultuous” as set forth in N.J.S. 2C:33-2(a) (1).61 
Since “tumultuous” is not defined in the statute, the Appellate 
Division consulted various dictionaries, as well as the limited case law 
in this area, to determine whether the defendant ’s conduct fell within 
the ambit of the statute.62  The court also considered whether the 
definition of “public,” found in subsection (b) of the statute, applied to 
the entire statute.63 
Ultimately, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s 
decision and found the defendant’s behavior to be tumultuous.64  It 
reasoned that the “defendant’s conduct caused public inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm and constituted overwhelming turbulence or 
upheaval.”65  The court further noted that “for the present purposes,” 
the word “public,” as defined below subsection b. of N.J.S. 2C:33-2(b), 
also applied to subsection a.66 
The Commission’s examination of the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), 
specifically §250.2, confirmed that New Jersey ’s Disorderly Conduct 
statute was modeled on the statue set forth in the MPC.67  The New 
Jersey statute’s definition of the term “public” is identical to the one 
found in the MPC section concerning disorderly conduct, and the 
definition is applicable to all the specified behaviors in the disorderly 
conduct statute of the MPC.68  A closer examination indicated no 
substantive differences, only a structural difference, between MPC § 
250.2 and N.J.S. 2C:33-2.69  To address the ambiguity, and following the 
 
	 60	 Id. 
	 61	 Finnemen, 2017 WL 4448541 at *1-2, *4. 
	 62	 Id. at *4-5.  The dictionaries were of little assistance to the court as it defined 
tumultuous as “marked by tumult”; “tending or disposed or cause to excite a tumult”; 
and “marked by violent or overwhelming turbulence or upheaval.”  The court examined 
the word “tumult” in the context of municipal ordinances affecting the rental of summer 
properties and defined it as either an “uproar” or “violent” agitation of mind or feelings.”  
In addition, the court found that excessive noise could be an uproar or violent agitation 
from the perspective of the victim.  See	United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough 
of Belmar, 343 N.J. Super. 1, 67 (App. Div. 2001). 
	 63	 Finnemen,	2017 WL4448541	at *4-5. 
	 64	 Id. at *5. 
	 65	 Id. 
	 66	 Id.	at *4-5. 
 67 MODEL PENAL CODE §250.2 Disorderly Conduct (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
	 68	 Id. 
	 69	 Id. 
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guidance of the MPC, the Commission proposed structural and language 
changes to bring clarity to the statute.70   
A survey of each state’s disorderly conduct statute revealed that 
twenty-four states use the term “tumultuous” in their statutes, while the 
remaining states do not.71  Indiana is currently the only state that 
provides a statutory definition for the term “tumultuous.”72  Its statute 
defines “tumultuous” as  “conduct that results in, or is likely to result in, 
serious bodily injury to a person or substantial damage to property.”73  
This definition could not be incorporated into New Jersey’s statutes 
because the term “serious bodily injury” is already a defined term in 
New Jersey’s CCJ, so a different modification was necessary.74 
In addition to the issues surrounding “tumultuous,” the  “offensive 
language” subsection of the New Jersey disorderly conduct statute was 
previously determined to be unconstitutional.75  In State	in	the	Interest	
of	H.D.,76 the Appellate Division considered the case of a juvenile who 
appealed an adjudication of juvenile delinquency resulting from his use 
of  “profane language” toward a police officer.77  The court stated that 
the predecessor statute to N.J.S. 2C:33-2(b), N.J.S.A. 2A:170-29(1), was 
found to be overbroad, and that both the Supreme Court of the United 
States and the New Jersey Supreme Court have “invalidat[ed] 
convictions for the public use of offensive language.”78  The Appellate 
Division reasoned that the standards in both the statutes were 
“practically identical” and that the defect of overbreadth found fatal in 
the earlier statute inheres in the latter.79  
The Commission’s proposed modifications to N.J.S. 2C:33-2 also 
use gender neutral language.80  In addition, the Report proposes striking 
 
 70 NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53. 
 71 NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53, at 7. 
 72 NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53, at 8. 
 73 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-1.  
	 74	 See	N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-1(b) where “serious bodily injury” is defined as “bodily 
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member 
or organ.” 
 75 State in the Interest of H.D., 206 N.J. Super. 58 (App. Div. 1985). 
	 76	 Id. 
	 77	 Id. 
	 78	 Id. at 60.	 N.J.S. 2A:170–29(1) prohibited the public from using “loud and offensive 
or profane or indecent language.”  Id.	(citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); State v. Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. 594 (1973) 
(recognizing that the disorderly conduct statute, N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:170-29(1) may not 
be utilized to punish speech which is offensive to the sensibilities of the hearer)). 
	 79	 Id. at 61.  
	 80	 See	NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 5353, at 11.  See	also	 
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the term  “annoyance” in subsection a. because of the term’s subjective 
nature.81  The Commission also proposed eliminating the word 
“tumultuous” from a(1) and, instead, adding language concerning 
excessive and unreasonable noise to the statute as a(2).82  Further,  
subsection b.’s prohibition against offensive language was proposed for 
elimination pursuant to the holding of State	in	the	Interest	of	H.D.83  The 
Commission’s suggested structural modifications to the statute include 
renumbering subsection a.(2) as a.(3) to accommodate the newly-
proposed subsection concerning noise, and the newly-proposed 
subsection b. makes clear that “public” applies to the entire section.84  
In response to the Commission’s outreach, both the Mercer and 
Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Offices offered favorable comments 
and support for the proposed modification to the Disorderly Conduct 
statute.85  Each acknowledged that clarifying and updating the statute 
would be beneficial to remove ambiguity found in the statute ’s current 
form.86 
C. HARASSMENT IN THE CRIMINAL LAW  
There is a fine line between constitutionally protected speech and 
criminal harassment under New Jersey’s CCJ.  Identification of that line 
 
	 81	 See	NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53, at 11. 
	 82	 See	NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra	note 53, at 2.	  See	also	United Prop. 
Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar,	343 N.J. Super. 1, 67 (App. Div. 2001) 
(“Although excessive noise does not qualify as disorderly conduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-
2b, unless it consists of coarse or abusive language, it falls within the rubric of 
tumultuous.”).  See	also	NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report	supra	note 53, at 8.		
	 83	 See	supra notes 75-79 and accompanying discussion. 
	 84	 See	NJLRC Dec. 2019 Final Report, supra note 53, at 12. 
	 85	 See	Letter from Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office *3 to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy 
Director, New Jersey Law Revision Commission (Jul. 8, 2019) (on file with the NJLRC).  
See	 also	 Memorandum from the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office *2 sent via 
electronic mail to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy Director, New Jersey Law Revision 
Commission (June 28, 2019) (on file with the NJLRC). 
	 86	 Id.		The other individuals and organizations from whom comments were sought 
by the Commission included: the Attorney General of New Jersey; the Appellate Section 
of the Attorney General’s Office; the Legislative Liaisons at the Office of the Attorney 
General; the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts; the New Jersey State 
Municipal Prosecutor’s Association; each of the twenty-one County Prosecutors; the 
New Jersey County Prosecutor’s Association; the New Jersey Office of the Public 
Defender; the New Jersey Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; the leadership of the 
Criminal Practice Section of the New Jersey State Bar Association; several criminal 
defense attorneys; the New Jersey State League of Municipalities; the New Jersey 
Association of Counties; the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police; the New 
Jersey Police Traffic Officers Association. 
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was the challenge that faced the New Jersey Supreme Court in State	v.	
Burkert,87 and the Commission.  
In March of 2020, the Commission released a Final Report intended 
to clarify the distinction between activities that are considered pure 
harassment, and those that serve a legitimate purpose or are 
constitutionally protected.88   
In Burkert, the relationship of two coworkers, Burkert and Halton, 
deteriorated when Burkert read online comments about himself and his 
family that had been posted by Halton’s wife.89  In retaliation, Burkert 
wrote “degrading and vile dialogue” on copies of the Haltons’ wedding 
photograph, which were later found on company property.90  In 
response, Halton filed three complaints charging Burkert with 
harassment under N.J.S. 2C:33–4(c).91  Burkert was found guilty by a 
municipal court judge and a Law Division judge after a trial de novo.92  
The Appellate Division vacated the conviction, finding that the defaced 
copies of the photographs did not amount to criminal harassment, but 
rather were a form of constitutionally protected expression.93 
The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of 
the harassment statute’s subsection (c) and determined that the 
phrases “any other course of alarming conduct” and “acts with purpose 
to alarm or seriously annoy” should be construed  “as repeated 
communications directed at a person that reasonably put that person in 
fear for his safety or security or that intolerably interfere with that 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy” when applied to cases 
based on “pure expressive activity.”94  
The court also explained that courts must narrowly construe 
statutes that criminalize expressive activity to avoid conflict with the 
 
 87 State v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257 (2017). 
 88 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Regarding Harassment N.J.S. 2C:33-4 et seq. 
(Mar. 19, 2020), www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2021) [hereinafter NJLRC Mar. 
2020 Final Report]; see	also	N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Draft Tentative Report Regarding 
Harassment N.J.S. 2C:33-4 (Apr. 8, 2019), www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2021). 
 89 Burkert,	231 N.J. at 262-63. 
	 90	 Id. at 262-63 (Copies were found “in the employee parking garage and locker 
room.”). 
	 91	 Id. at 263. 
	 92	 Id. (Defendant found guilty on two complaints.). 
	 93	 Id. at 269, 283 (agreeing that the defaced photographs were nonetheless 
“unprofessional, puerile, and inappropriate for the workplace”). 
 94 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33–4(c) (2021); Burkert, 231 N.J. at 283-85 (noting that “the 
Legislature may decide to amend subsection (c) with other language that conforms to 
the requirements of our free-speech clauses”). 
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constitutional right to free speech.95  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
found that “the vaguely and broadly worded standard…does not put a 
reasonable person on sufficient notice” of speech that is proscribed, and 
that its vagueness created undue discretion for “prosecuting 
authorities…to bring charges related to permissive expressive 
activities.”96  
The court said that the statute allows the “conviction of a person 
who acts with the purpose to ‘seriously annoy’ another person,” unlike 
the corresponding MPC provision, which is premised on  “alarming 
conduct” and is restricted to conduct that serves “no legitimate 
purpose[.]”97  Speech cannot be made criminal  “merely because it 
annoys, disturbs, or arouses contempt[.]”98  Determining that the 
legislative intent was to “address harassment by action rather than 
communication,” the court attempted to read the statute as 
constitutional in its construction of the terms at issue.99  The court found 
that Burkert displayed insensitivity, but “did not engage in repeated 
unwanted communications” “that intolerably interfered 
with…[Halton’s]…reasonable expectation of privacy” and therefore the 
harassment complaint must fail.100 
In addition to the issues raised in Burkert,	the court in the earlier 
case of State	v.	Hoffman101 was concerned with the statutory phrase “or 
any other manner.”102  The Hoffman court found that this catchall phrase 
included only modes of communication that intrude into legitimate 
expectations of privacy, which protected the statute from constitutional 
attack as overbroad.103	
New Jersey courts have emphasized that many protected forms of 
speech are intended to annoy, and have used the requirement of a 
“purpose to harass” to limit the statutory section.104 
 
	 95	 Burkert, 231 N.J. at 269, 277-78 (The Court also referred to the Model Penal Code 
(MPC) and examined how other courts addressed similar statutes to determine the level 
of precision required in its analysis.). 
	 96	 Id. at 280 (noting	“[t]he circularity of the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:33–4, moreover, 
does not place limits on the statute”). 
	 97	 Id. at 280 (citing N.J.S. 2C:33–4(c)). 
	 98	 Id. at 281;	see Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (citations omitted).   
	 99	 Burkert, 231 N.J. at 284-85; see Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 404 (1998) (further 
citations omitted); ibid. (Unlike other jurisdictions that struck down overbroad and 
vague statutes). 
	 100	 Burkert, 231 N.J. at 286-87.  
	 101	 See,	e.g.,	State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997). 
	 102	 Id. at 582. 
	 103	 Id.	at 583. 
	 104	 Id.	at 583-584 (1997) (“Many forms of speech, oral or written, are intended to 
annoy. Letters to the editor of a newspaper are sometimes intended to annoy their 
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The Commission also examined the MPC, New Jersey’s Cyber-
Harassment, Stalking, and Assault statutes, and the statutes of other 
states, for additional guidance.105  Although no one statute provided a 
definitive model that could replace the current New Jersey harassment 
statute, several suggested approaches that were helpful.106  This 
research formed the basis of the Commission’s consideration of issues 
such as: whether “seriously distressed” included both mental and 
physical harm; the requisite level of harm; mental and physical  “harm” 
versus “health”; “distress” versus “alarm”; “distress” versus 
“intimidate”; whether “alarm” is synonymous with “threat”; and the fact 
that most statutes do not use the terms “alarm” and “mental health[.]”107 
In keeping with its practice, the Commission distributed its Report 
to, and sought comments from, knowledgeable individuals and 
organizations.108  No objections were received in response to the 
recommended modifications. 109 
 
subjects. We do not criminalize such speech, even if intended to annoy, because the 
manner of speech is non-intrusive.”).  See also, R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208 (App. Div. 
2017) (in which defendant sent many coarsely-worded text messages in a dispute 
between brothers over the proper care of their parents, but the legitimate purpose for 
the messages supported the court’s finding that there was no intent to harass); see	also 
J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. at 481, 485 (determining that if the defendant’s purpose in taking 
photographs of the plaintiff’s house late at night was to collect evidence for a custody 
action, he was not guilty of harassment even though the plaintiff was both annoyed and 
alarmed); see	also State v. L.C., 283 N.J. Super. 441, 448-451 (App. Div. 1995) (court 
reversed a guilty conviction where a wife used vulgar language while yelling at her 
husband about his girlfriend). 
 105 NJLRC Mar. 2020 Final Report, supra note 88; see	MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 cmt. 
6; see	 also Memorandum from John Cannel and Samuel Silver to N.J. Law Revision 
Comm’n. (Jun. 10, 2019), www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2021) (including statutes 
from sixteen other states) [hereinafter Cannel & Silver Jun. 2019 Memorandum]; see	also	
N.J.S. 2C:33-4.1 (Crime of Cyber-Harassment), N.J.S. 2C:12-10 (Definitions; Stalking 
Designated a Crime; Degrees), and N.J.S. 2C:12-1 (Assault). 
	 106	 See Cannel & Silver Jun. 2019 Memorandum, supra note 105.  Harassment statutes 
in other states frequently serve as the basis for civil orders to protect vulnerable citizens 
from domestic violence, which highlights the necessity of having a statute broad enough 
to protect domestic violence victims but which is not so vague or overbroad that it 
unjustly affects the liberty of persons against whom those claims have been made.  See	
also 2C:25-19. 
 107 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Minutes	of	NJLRC	Meeting, Jun. 20, 2019, www.njlrc.org 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2021) [hereinafter Minutes from Jun. 2019 NJLRC Meeting]. 
 108 NJLRC Mar. 2020 Final Report, supra note 88. 
 109 NJLRC Mar. 2020 Final Report, supra note 88.		Individuals and organizations from 
whom comments were sought by the Commission included: the New Jersey Association 
of Counties; New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police; New Jersey State League of 
Municipalities; Office of the Attorney General; Office of the Public Defender; New Jersey 
State Municipal Prosecutors’ Association; the Chief of Law Enforcement of Sussex 
County; New Jersey Police Traffic Officers Association; and numerous County 
Prosecutor’s Offices. 
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The Commission’s proposed revisions to the statute begin with the 
opening language of the statute, adding language indicating that the 
harassment must be “in a manner clearly excessive in light of any 
legitimate justification[.]”110  This language was derived from the MPC 
to address situations in which a defendant intended to harass the victim, 
but for a legitimate purpose.111  The Commission proposed removal of 
gendered language throughout.  In addition, the proposal replaced the 
vague term “harass” with the suggested language “harm or seriously 
distress” in order to retain the current purpose requirement112 and 
replaced “purpose” with “intent.”113 
In subsection (a), the Commission proposed the deletion of the 
difficult-to-apply standard “offensively coarse language,” and the 
substitution of  “manner intended to distress or alarm” for  “manner 
likely to cause annoyance or alarm.”114   
The proposed language in subsection (c) was modeled on the New 
Jersey Cyber-Harassment statute.115  The Commission also proposed 
that “engages” be replaced with the more specific  “[t]hreatens to inflict 
injury or physical harm to any person or the property of any person, or 
engages in” and that  “alarm or seriously annoy such other person” be 
replaced with “cause emotional harm or place a person in fear of 
physical or emotional harm.”116  The Commission incorporated the 
phrase “without legitimate purpose” from the cyber-harassment statute 
 
 110 NJLRC Mar. 2020 Final Report, supra note 88; (R.G. v. R.G. (involving a dispute 
about care of parents) and State v. Finance American Corp. (regarding debt collection) 
may be such situations); Memorandum from John Cannel and Samuel Silver to N.J. Law 
Revision Comm’n (Feb. 11, 2019), www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 20., 2021) (The first 
change reads “and without other legitimate purpose, the person.”) [hereinafter Cannel 
& Silver Feb. 2019 Memo]. 
 111 Cannel & Silver Feb. 2019 Memorandum, supra	note 110 (Added “and without 
other legitimate purpose.”). 
 112 Cannel & Silver Jun. 2019 Memorandum, supra note 105 (This is more limited 
than alternatives such as annoy, bother, or disturb.); see also	NJLRC Mar. 2020 Final 
Report, supra note 88. 
 113 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Minutes	of	NJLRC	Meeting, Mar. 19, 2020, www.njlrc.org 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2021) (During the March 2020 meeting, the Commission reviewed 
the proposed modifications and discussed whether the word “properly” or “purposely” 
should be used in the place of “intent.”  The Commission unanimously voted to release 
the completed work as a Final Report.).		 
 114 Cannel & Silver Jun. 2019 Memorandum, supra note 105; N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, 
Revised Draft Tentative Report Regarding Harassment N.J.S. 2C:33-4 (Nov. 8, 2019), 
www.njlrc.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2021) (Staff also retained language tentatively 
approved by the Commission, fixed capitalization, replaced “the person” with “the 
individual” and “or any other manner” with “in a manner.”). 
 115 Adopted by L.2013, c. 272.  That statute is a more recent expression of legislative 
intent than 2C:33-4. 
 116 Cannel & Silver Feb. 2019 Memorandum, supra	note 110. 
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to clarify that the mens rea element of the statute focuses on “core 
conduct,” intent, and not speech.117  The proposal changed the 
“purpose” requirement from  “alarm or seriously annoy” to “harm” to 
assure that the activities included in the  “other course of alarming 
conduct or of repeatedly committed acts” are serious enough to merit 
criminal sanctions.118  Finally, the Commission’s proposal streamlined 
and restructured the statute to incorporate the proposed revisions.  
D. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT BY MEANS OF BODILY FLUIDS 
In State	v.	Majewski,119 the Appellate Division considered whether 
N.J.S. 2C:12-13, which prohibits the throwing of bodily fluids at law 
enforcement officers, requires the State to prove that the defendant 
intended to hit the officer with bodily fluid, or whether intent was 
irrelevant under the doctrine of transferred intent.120  The Majewski	
court considered a situation in which, during a routine move of an 
inmate at the county jail, the defendant spat in the face of one of the 
corrections officers.121  The defendant and other inmate witnesses told 
the investigating sheriff’s officer that the defendant’s target was an 
inmate, not the officer.122  The defendant was charged with “throw[ing] 
bodily fluids at [the corrections officer] . . . [while the] said officer . . . was 
acting in the performance of her duties while in uniform or exhibiting 
evidence of her authority, contrary to N.J.S. 2C:12-13.”123 
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the 
statute required the State to prove that the defendant “intended to hit 
[the officer] with bodily fluid.”124  The defendant argued that even if it 
was an offense, “spitting at someone” should not be elevated into 
aggravated assault simply because the fluid accidentally hit an officer.125 
The State acknowledged the statute’s ambiguity regarding the 
requisite mental state.126  “Nevertheless, it argued the [s]tatute explicitly 
incorporated the doctrine of transferred intent because it criminalized 
not only the throwing of a bodily fluid at an officer, but also conduct that 
‘otherwise purposely subjected [the officer] to contact with a bodily 
 
	 117	 Minutes	from Jun. 2019 NJLRC Meeting, supra	note 107. 
 118 Cannel & Silver Jun. 2019 Memorandum, supra note 105. 
	 119	 State	v.	Majewski, 450 N.J. Super. 353, 360 (App. Div. 2017). 
	 120	 Id. at 359-60. 
	 121	 Id.	at 358. 
	 122	 Id.	at 358-359. 
	 123	 Id.	at 359. 
	 124	 Id. 
	 125	 Majewski, 450 N.J. Super. at 359. 
	 126	 Id. 
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fluid.’”127  The Appellate Division indicated that the statute lacked clarity 
regarding “whether the Legislature intended the same culpable mental 
state—’purposely’—that expressly applies to ‘subject[ing] [an officer] 
to contact with a bodily fluid’” to also apply to ‘“throw[ing] a bodily fluid 
at’ such an officer.”128 
The Appellate Division determined that for a defendant to be found 
guilty of aggravated assault pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:12-13, the State must 
prove that: (1) the defendant acted purposely in throwing bodily fluid 
or otherwise purposely subjected the victim to contact with a bodily 
fluid; (2) the victim was, beyond a reasonable doubt, an employee of one 
of the law enforcement agencies set forth in the statute; and, (3) the 
victim was, beyond a reasonable doubt, engaged in the performance of 
the duties of his or her office at the time of the offense.129  The court held 
that the doctrine of transferred intent did not apply because a defendant 
does not violate the statute unless the conduct was purposeful and the 
result was within his or her design.130 
The Commission initiated a project to consider the modification of 
N.J.S. 2C:12-13 as a result of the Appellate Division’s decision in State	v.	
Majewski.131  To ameliorate the statutory ambiguity identified by the 
Majewski	court, the Commission sought comments from knowledgeable 
individuals and organizations and received feedback from the Cape May 
County Prosecutor’s Office, the Appellate Section of the Office of the 
Public Defender, and the County Prosecutors Association of New 
Jersey.132 
In addition to amending N.J.S. 2C:12-13 to reflect the purposeful 
mental state as discussed in Majewski, the Cape May County 
Prosecutor’s Office recommended additional modifications based on 
the legislative history of the statute and the mental element included in 
other similar statutes.133  Although the legislation at the time of 
enactment was specifically intended to protect corrections and parole 
 
	 127	 Id. 
	 128	 Id.	at 361 (citing N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-12). 
	 129	 Id.	at 361-63 (citing Model	Jury	Charge	(Criminal), “Aggravated Assault (Throwing 
Bodily Fluid at a Corrections Employee) (N.J.S.A. 2C:12–13),” n.1-2, (June 10, 2002)).  
	 130	 Id. at 363. 
 131 See	N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final	Report	Regarding	the	Intent	Necessary	for	the	
Aggravated	 Assault	 Upon	 an	 Officer	 under	 N.J.S.	 2C:12‐13, at 2 (July 30, 2020), 
www.njlrc.org [hereinafter NJLRC July 2020 Final Report]; see	 also	N.J. LAW REVISION 
COMM’N, Minutes	of	NJLRC	Meeting, July 30, 2020, at 1, www.njlrc.org (last visited Feb. 21, 
2021). 
 132 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra	note 131.	
 133 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra	note	131, at 6 n. 30 (citing Letter from Ed 
Shim, Senior Assistant Prosecutor, Cape May County, to the New Jersey Law Revision 
Commission (July 08, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC)). 
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officers, it has been broadened since enactment so that other officers 
may seek its protections.134  The Cape May County Prosecutor’s Office 
expressed concern that an assault with bodily fluids from an intoxicated 
individual, and a purposeful assault on one officer with incidental 
exposure to another might not be covered by the statute under the 
holding in Majewski, despite involving the same harm.135  The 
Commission’s drafting addressed this concern. 
The Office of the Public Defender did not object to modifications to 
N.J.S. 2C:12-13 that would make “the requirements of a higher mental 
state for all elements more explicit in the statutory text” but did express 
concern that the Commission’s proposed modifications “would invite 
unwarranted prosecutions and would stigmatize severe respiratory 
illness during a pandemic.”136  The Commission’s drafting addressed 
this concern as well.  
The proposed revisions to the assault statute incorporate a 
definition of reasonable fear as suggested by the County Prosecutors 
Association of New Jersey (“CPANJ”).137  The revisions also replace the 
term “intentionally” in 2C:12-1(a)(4) with the word “purposely” to 
“serve the legislature’s intent to promote the clarity of definitions of 
specific crimes and dispel obscurity with which the culpability 
requirement is often treated when concepts such as  ‘general criminal 
intent ’. . . ‘presumed intent, ’. . . and the like are used.”138  Finally, the 
Commission’s proposal replaces the phrase “placing [protected 
individuals] in contact with bodily fluid” with more limited language 
requiring that an actor  “subject[ ] the individual to contact with bodily 
fluid or otherwise hav[e] physical contact with the individual, for no 
lawful purpose,” as recommended by the CPANJ.139 
During the course of its work in this area, the Commission 
considered the impact of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) 
on its project.  COVID-19 is a contagious, and potentially fatal, 
respiratory disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus.140  On March 9, 
 
 134 A. 1598, 1996 Leg. Sess. (N.J. Feb. 29, 1996) (Statement of Assemblyman Zisa); 
NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra	note	131, at 6 n. 31-32. 
 135 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra	note	131 (citing Letter from Ed Shim, Senior 
Assistant Prosecutor, Cape May County, to the New Jersey Law Revision Commission, 2–
3 (July 08, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC)). 
 136 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra	note	131,	at 7	(citing Letter from the Joseph 
J. Russo, Deputy Public Defender, Appellate Section, to the New Jersey Law Revision 
Commission, 1 (July 10, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC)). 
 137 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra	note	131, at 9. 
 138 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra	note	131, at 9. 
 139 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra	note	131, at 9. 
 140 Exec. Order No. 103, Governor Murphy, (Mar. 9, 2020). 
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2020, as part of New Jersey’s coordinated response to address COVID-
19, Governor Phil Murphy declared a State of Emergency and a Public 
Health Emergency.141  The issuance of Executive Order No. 103 declared 
that New Jersey was in a state of emergency as a result of the public 
health crisis across all 21 counties in New Jersey.142 
In March 2020, an individual was charged with a felony for 
coughing at a supermarket employee and claiming to be infected with 
COVID-19.143  Other individuals, in separate instances, were arrested 
and charged with aggravated assault for throwing bodily fluid on police 
officers.144  Each of the individuals claimed to be infected with COVID-
19, and coughed on responding police officers.145 
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission broadened the 
scope of its work to address whether a defendant who deliberately 
coughs or sneezes at another person with the intent of causing that 
person to believe that they would be infected with a virus can be 
charged with aggravated assault or simple assault under N.J.S. 2C:12-13 
or N.J.S. 2C:12-1.  
The Final Report released on July 30, 2020, recommended 
significant amendments to N.J.S. 2C:12-13, including the addition of 
language codifying the purposeful mens rea and expanding the list of 
protected law enforcement officers to include county corrections 
employees, parole officers, members of the Parole Board, and Adult 
Diagnostic and Treatment Center employees.146  The Commission also 
recommended the addition of a subsection to N.J.S. 2C:12-1 that would 
recognize the act of attempting to place someone in reasonable fear of 
contracting a contagious disease by purposely coughing, sneezing, 
 
	 141	 Id.	 See	Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Murphy Declares State of 
Emergency, Public Health Emergency to Strengthen State Preparedness to Contain the 
Spread of COVID-19 (Mar. 09, 2020) 
(https://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562020/approved/20200309b.shtml) (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2021). 
	 142	 Id. 
 143 New York Times, A	Man	Coughed	on	a	Wegmans	Employee.	Now	He’s	Charged	With	
a	 Felony, March 25, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/us/coronavirus-
terrorism-nj.html (last visited March 26, 2021). 
 144 Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, AG Grewal: If You Threaten a Cop 
with COVID-19, You will Face the Maximum Criminal Charges (Apr. 1, 2020) 
(https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases20/pr20200401a.html) (last visited Mar. 19, 
2021).  The additional charges filed against each of these individuals are more fully 
presented in the Attorney General’s Press Release. 
	 145	 Id. 
	 146	 See	generally	NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra	note	131. 
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spitting, or subjecting to contact with bodily fluid, or otherwise having 
physical contact with the person, as a simple assault.147  
E. KIDNAPPING AND THE UNHARMED RELEASE PROVISION 
The “unharmed release” provision of New Jersey’s kidnapping 
statute, N.J.S. 2C:13-1(c)(1), does not set forth the type of harm 
contemplated by the Legislature to find a defendant guilty of first-
degree kidnapping.148  This provision has been the subject of litigation; 
first, in State	 v.	 Sherman149	 and most recently in State	 v.	 Nunez‐
Mosquea.150	 	 After the Appellate Division’s decision in Sherman, the 
model jury charge for kidnapping was modified on two separate 
occasions to address this issue.151  In December of 2020, the Commission 
released a Final Report proposing modifications to the statute to clarify 
that the “harm” component of New Jersey’s kidnapping statute should 
include physical, emotional, or psychological harm.152  
In Nunez‐Mosquea, the court considered a case in which a woman 
was kidnapped at gunpoint and forced into a van by the defendant.153  
The defendant gagged, kicked, suffocated, and sexually assaulted the 
victim.154  After being released, the victim assisted the police in locating 
the defendant.155  The defendant was arrested and charged with first-
degree kidnapping.156  
The defendant requested a modification of the model jury charge 
for first-degree kidnapping at a charge conference.157  The jury, he 
argued, should have been advised that “minimal or insubstantial 
injuries are insufficient to establish physical harm.”158  The defendant 
argued that Sherman acknowledged a difference between emotional and 
 
 147 NJLRC July 2020 Final Report, supra	note 131. 
 148 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Final Report Regarding Proposed Changes to New 
Jersey’s Kidnapping Statute to Clarify that the “Harm” Component Includes Physical, 
Emotional, or Psychological Harm, N.J.S. 2C:13-1(c)(1) (Dec. 17, 2020), www.njlrc.org 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2021) [hereinafter NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report]. 
 149 State v. Sherman,	367 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div.), cert.	denied, 180 N.J. 356 (2004) 
overruled	in	part	on	other	grounds, State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005). 
 150 State	v.	Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 (App. Div. Aug. 24, 2017). 
 151 NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report, supra note 148. 
	 152	 See N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, ‘Kidnapping’, Minutes	 of	NJLRC	Meeting,	Dec. 17, 
2020,	Newark, New Jersey (held virtually) www.njlrc.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2021); 
NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report, supra note 148. 
	 153	 Nunez‐Mosquea,	2017 WL 3623378 at *1. 
	 154	 Id.	at *1-2. 
	 155	 Id.	at *2. 
	 156	 Id.	at *3. 
	 157	 Id.  Defendant relied on State v. Sherman,	267 N.J. Super. 324. 
	 158	 Id.	 
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psychological harm sufficient to satisfy the statute and “the type of harm 
inherent in every kidnapping.”159  That distinction, defendant 
maintained, should apply to all harm and not merely psychological 
harm.160  The court denied the defendant’s request.161  
The court convicted the defendant and sentenced him to twenty-
five years in state prison for first-degree kidnapping.162  On appeal, he 
contended that the trial court “failed to properly instruct the jury on the 
harm element of the first-degree kidnapping charge, [thereby depriving 
him] of his rights to a fair trial and due process.”163  New Jersey’s 
kidnapping statute contains a grading provision that provides that 
“kidnapping is a crime of the first degree… [but i]f the actor released the 
victim unharmed and in a safe place prior to apprehension, it is a crime 
of the second degree.”164  
The Appellate Division in Nunez‐Mosquea	observed that “[n]o New 
Jersey case of which we are aware has ever suggested that there is a 
difference between the physical harm sufficient to satisfy the released 
unharmed provision of the statute and ‘the type of harm inherent in 
every kidnapping.’”165  The court recognized that while “[i]t may be 
possible that some types of injury would be of such trifling nature as to 
be excluded from the category of injuries which [the Legislature] had in 
mind…,”166 those inflicted upon the victim in this case were “plainly not 
of that trifling character.”167  
The question of harm raised by the defendant in Nunez‐Mosquea	
was examined by the court in State	v.	Sherman fifteen years earlier.168		
In Sherman, the defendant abducted a child and held her for ransom for 
approximately twenty-four hours.169  During that time, he built her a 
“fort” from couch cushions and fed her snacks, before deciding to return 
the child to her parents without receiving a ransom.170  The defendant 
left the victim at a shopping mall and instructed her “to run to the first 
 
	 159	 Nunez‐Mosquea,	2017 WL 3623378 at	*8.	 
	 160	 Id.	 
	 161	 Id.	 
	 162	 Id.	at *12. 
	 163	 Id.	at *13. 
 164 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-1(c)(1) (2020)	(emphasis added). 
 165 Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 at *19. 
	 166	 Id.	at *19-20 (citing	Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 285 (1945)). 
	 167	 Id.	at *20. 
 168 State v. Sherman, 367 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div.) cert.	denied,	180 N.J. 356 (2004), 
overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005).  
	 169	 Id.  
	 170	 Id.	at 332.  
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adults she saw and tell them the police were looking for her.”171  
Although the victim appeared to be in “good condition, with no signs of 
physical injury or emotional distress” and said that “the man that took 
her treated her nicely,” she was subsequently “diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder.”172 
In Sherman, the Appellate Division specifically rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the victim’s anxiety, nightmares, and fear 
constituted only minimal emotional or psychological harm insufficient 
to support the charge of first-degree kidnapping.173  The court held that 
“harm in the released unharmed provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c) 
includes emotional or psychological harm suffered by the victim.”174  
The court went on to hold that the State is required to “prove that a 
defendant ‘knowingly’ harmed or ‘knowingly’ released the victim in an 
unsafe place.”175  The focus of the harm component of the unharmed 
release provision in the kidnapping statute is on the “conduct of the 
kidnapper during the purposeful removal and holding or confining of 
the victim.”176  
In 2007, the Model Jury Charge for Kidnapping was amended in 
response to Sherman to provide that the State must prove the defendant 
“knowingly harmed” or “knowingly did not release” the victim in a safe 
place prior to apprehension.177  The Charge clarified that the harm 
component can include physical, emotional, or psychological harm.178  
In 2014, the Model Jury Charge for kidnapping was revised once 
again to provide that: “[i]f the State is contending that the victim 
suffered emotional or psychological harm, it must prove that the victim 
suffered emotional or psychological harm beyond that inherent in a 
kidnapping.  That is, the State must prove that the victim suffered 
substantial or enduring emotional or psychological harm.”179 
As is its practice, the Commission reached out to knowledgeable 
individuals and organizations for comments on its work during the 
 
	 171	 Id.	at 333.  
	 172	 Id.	at 333-24.  
	 173	 Id.	at 330-31, 342.  
	 174	 Sherman, 367 N.J. Super. at 330. 
	 175	 Id.	 
	 176	 Id.	 
	 177	 Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 at *6. 
	 178	 Id.	 See	Model	 Jury	Charge	 (Criminal), “Kidnapping – Permanent Deprivation of 
Custody” (revised Mar 5, 2007). 
	 179	 See	generally Model	Jury	Charge	(Criminal), “Kidnapping” (revised Oct. 6, 2014); 
Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 at *7 (quoting Model	 Jury	 Charge	 (Criminal), 
“Kidnapping” (revised Oct. 6, 2014)). 
THARNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2021  7:11 PM 
2021]	 ON	THE	PATH	TOWARDS	PRECISION 351 
course of this project.180  The Division of Criminal Justice (“DCJ”) 
indicated that the proposed revisions captured the guidance proposed 
by the case law and modified the statute in a way that will provide 
greater comprehension and clarity.181 
The mental element, “knowing”, is well established by the existing 
case law but is absent from the statute.  The DCJ supported the 
Commission’s proposal to incorporate the knowledge standard into the 
text of the statute.182  The DCJ also concurred with the Commission’s 
recommendation to revise and consolidate the “removal” element of the 
statute, clarifying the statute without substantially altering its 
meaning.183  The language of this proposed modification “will reduce 
disputes over textual ambiguities and provided well-defined 
parameters for defendants, counsel, jurors and jurists alike.”184  
As discussed in Nunez‐Mosquea, proposed modifications to 
subsection b.(1) reflect that to demonstrate that a kidnapper is guilty of 
first-degree kidnapping, the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the kidnapper “knowingly” caused harm to the victim.185  In 
addition, the court held that “disproving unharmed release is a material 
element of the crime of first-degree kidnapping, requiring the State to 
prove that a defendant ‘knowingly’ harmed or ‘knowingly’ released the 
victim in an unsafe place.”186  That language has been incorporated into 
the text of the proposed statutory revisions, in subsections b.(1)-(2).187  
The Commission also proposed a definition for “harm” in 
subsection (f.).  The inclusion of this definition “… in the text of the 
statute itself is an important expansion that will reduce 
 
 180 NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report supra	note 148, at 5. 
 181 NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report, supra	note 148, at 5-6; Comments from the Division 
of Criminal Justice to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy Director, New Jersey Law Revision 
Commission *1 (Nov. 19, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC) [hereinafter DCJ Comments Nov. 
2020].  The other individuals and organizations from whom comments were sought 
included: the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts; the New Jersey Municipal 
Prosecutor’s Association; Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; the Office of the 
Public Defender; the Criminal Law Section of the New Jersey State Bar Association; the 
New Jersey County Prosecutor’s Association and each of the County Prosecutors; private 
criminal defense attorneys; the New Jersey State League of Municipalities; the New 
Jersey Association of Counties; New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police; and the 
New Jersey Police Traffic Officers Association. 
	 182	 Id. at 6. 
	 183	 Id. 
	 184	 Id.  
	 185	 Nunez‐Mosquea, 2017 WL 3623378 at *6.  
	 186	 Id. (citing	State v. Sherman, 367 N.J. Super. 324, 330 (2004)).  
 187 NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report, supra	note 148, at 9. 
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misinterpretations of an essential element of the offense.”188  Without 
the proposed language, “prosecutions with facts similar to Sherman, 
where the victim is released prior to apprehension without any physical 
injuries, could potentially be overlooked by prosecutors who fail to 
comprehend the very serious mental toll inflicted by such incidents.”189  
Such a result would trivialize the very real trauma experienced by this 
class of victim and undermine public safety.190 
In the context of a kidnapping, the victim may experience 
psychological or emotional harm, or both.191  The DCJ recommended a 
single clause that provides, “… (2) substantial or enduring emotional or 
psychological harm, or both.”192  This recommendation is reflected in 




The courts agree that no one should “be punished for a crime 
unless both that crime and its punishment are clearly set forth in 
positive laws.”193  They also agree that penal statutes “must be 
sufficiently definite so that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited.”194  
The New Jersey Law Revision Commission, in keeping with its 
statutory mandate, continues to bring to the attention of the Legislature 
areas of New Jersey’s CCJ that could be made clearer, and to support the 
Legislature in its efforts to improve New Jersey’s law “in response to the 
existing and emerging needs of its citizens.”195   
 
 
 188 NJLRC Dec. 2020 Final Report,	supra	note 148, at 6-7, 11.  DCJ Comments Nov. 
2020, supra	note 181, at *1.  See	discussion, supra	notes 168-176,	of State v. Sherman,	
367 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div. 2004). 
	 189	 Id. 
	 190	 Id. 
	 191	 Id.	at *2.  
	 192	 Id. 
 193 State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 17-18 (1987) (quoting In re Suspension of DeMarco,	
83 N.J. at 36).  
	 194	 Id. (citing Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983)). 
 195 N.J. LAW REVISION COMM’N, THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT (2020) 3, www.njlrc.org 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2021). 
